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Michelman: A Reply to Baker and Balkin

A REPLY TO BAKER AND BALKIN
Frank I. Michelman*
In no way does my selection of two of the Symposium contributions to which
to make some reply here reflect on my regard for the other contributions. I could
not, just now, pay to all of the contributions the attention they deserve, and so I
had to make some choice about which to take up here. To all who contributed, I
am grateful beyond words.
I take up the essays of Professors Baker and Balkin because they deal
directly and in detail with a particular, current project in which I expect to be
engaged for some time yet to come. Both essays offer tellingly perceptive
commentaries about my work on that project to date, along with proposals of high
import regarding its further development. With limited time and space, I cannot
do justice to the richness of these commentaries or even make a bow to every
nugget of insight and wisdom they contain. Both essays have challenged me to
clarify the state of my thinking about the project in certain important respects, on
which I concentrate in what follows.

How can liberals committed to normative individualism' justify conduct in
support of the coercive operations of constitutional-democratic government?
Edwin Baker and I share the view that this is possible only when some relevant set
of motivational, social-environmental, and institutional conditions is satisfied. It
might, for example, be a set of conditions roughly like this: (1) a lawmaking
process "truly open" to the discursive participation of all;2 (2) entrenchment of
certain rights of persons regardless of what political majorities may say to the
contrary;3 and (3) on the part of each participant, a refusal to justify any exercise

Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
1. See C. Edwin Baker, Michelman on ConstitutionalDemocracy, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 511, 511-12
(2004) (describing "liberal normative individualism" as a position that "in particular emphasizes the
moral importance of viewing the person ideally as 'free and equal'); id. at 520 (endorsing the liberal
assumption that "the people to whom the justification must be provided are conceived of as being free
and equal" and examining this view's possible alternative implications regarding the necessary
conditions of political and legal legitimacy); id. at 521 (suggesting an intersubjective understanding of
liberal "freedom in respect to... law" that can be satisfied by providing each individual with "an
appropriate form of participatory involvement"); id. at 534 (calling the recommended "appropriate
process" norm an "alternative interpretation of normative individualism").
2. Id.
3. See Baker, supra n. 1, at 534.
*
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of coercive political power by appeal to considerations, as reasons, that the
participant does not sincerely believe all the others "could5 and should accept" 4-a
practical attitude we might call by the name of reciprocity.

Can one posit a plausibly realizable set of such conditions, satisfaction of
which renders morally justifiable, on liberal terms of reciprocity, one's supportive
participation in constitutional democracy? If one cannot, it seems one then, in all
honesty, must choose between one's attachment to liberal reciprocity and one's
Reciprocity-minded, liberal
attachment to constitutional democracy.
constitutional democrats, therefore, have reason to proceed at least initially on the
assumption that at least one set of such redemptive conditions exists. The leading
question then becomes: What are the conditions in the set? For workers in the
vineyards of constitutional theory, that question leads to the following two: What,
if anything, can the idea of a good or ideal constitution contribute to a defensible
solution? What, accordingly, is the prescriptive content of a good or ideal

constitution?
My series of forays into these questions6 has so far centered mostly on

proposed responses sharing an approach that I am going to call "constitution-ascontract.,

7

I do not mean thereby to imply that, in these responses, a constitution

is regarded as an actual contract. Obviously, no real-world constitution is or can
be that, given the lack of signification of assent from everyone treated as bound.
But a constitution nevertheless may be regarded as acting like a contract in the

following way: The constitution in force serves as a rule for the conduct of
lawmaking and other governmental operations, conformity to which may be

sufficient to endow the resultant stream of legislative and other governmental
product with a strongly presumptive, moral claim to public support. Whether
conformity to the constitution in force will be sufficient to that end will depend on
the aptness and adequacy to this task of the prescriptive content of that particular

4. Id.
5. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism xlvi (paper ed., Colum. U. Press 1996) (defining the
"criterion of reciprocity: our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that
the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a
justification of those actions" and treating reciprocity as a key to legitimacy).
6. See Jack M. Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39 Tulsa
L. Rev. 485, 485 n. 2 (2004) (collecting authorities); Frank I. Michelman, Relative Constraint and Public
Reason: What Is "The Work We Expect of Law"?, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 963, 974 (2002) [hereinafter
Michelman, Relative Constraint and Public Reason]; Frank I. Michelman, Morality, Identity and
"Constitutional Patriotism," 76 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1009, 1018-19 (1999) [hereinafter Michelman,
ConstitutionalPatriotism].
7. I choose this term in preference to "constitutional contractualist." Cf. Baker, supra n. 1, at 517.
In contemporary political philosophy, the term "contractualist" carries a connotation of a certain
conception of morality, as rooted in a "desire to be able to justify one's actions to others on grounds
they could not reasonably reject," given a desire on their part to find principles that others similarly
motivated could not reasonably reject.
T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in
Utilitarianismand Beyond 103, 116 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., Cambridge U. Press 1982);
see Rawls, supra n. 5, at 50 ("Reasonable persons.., desire for its own sake a social world in which
they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity
should hold ....
"). I mean to keep my inquiries anchored at all times to a morality that is
contractualist in that sense, but I also mean to treat constitution-as-contract approaches, as defined in
the text immediately following this note, as very much open to question. I am asking whether
constitution-as-contract follows from contractualism, or even is compatible with contractualism.
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constitution.
If the constitutional contract in force is thus satisfactory in
substance, public support of all the legislative results achieved in conformity to it
is morally warranted, regardless of how repellent some of the results may be to
some of the parties. That is the nub of the constitution-as-contract idea.
Constitution-as-contract can play a pivotal part in attempts to define a set of
conditions for the liberal legitimacy of constitutional democracy. For me, the
emblematic case has been John Rawls's proposed "liberal principle of legitimacy":
[O]ur exercise of [coercive] political power is proper and hence justifiable only when
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of
legitimacy. 8
Scanning my investigations to date of constitution-as-contract approaches to
liberal political justification, Professor Baker finds it difficult to make out a
bottom line. I do not blame him. Constitution-as-contract ideas hold strong
attractions for me, and the explorations Baker reviews started out, just as he
detects, with the idea of possibly redeeming such ideas from objections of the
kinds he identifies in his masterful review. As Baker also perceptively observes,
though, my stance has been shifting as the explorations have proceeded-to a
point, now, where constitution-as-contract and I stand at arms' length.9
Rather, therefore, than look backward at the work of mine that Baker has
inspected so incisively, I would like to keep the conversation a forward-looking
one. As one significant consequence, you will find below no mention of the notion
of every affected individual's being able to see himself or herself as author of the
laws of the country. I am persuaded by Baker's very forceful arguments that such
a formulation sets an unnecessarily strong condition for liberal justification of
political coercion. With that move to common ground as a start, I want to offer
some preliminary thoughts in response to Baker's constructive proposals for
political justification without constitution-as-contract.
I begin with a brief discussion of Baker's proposed communicative-ethical
alternative to what he calls a Kantian take on normative individualism,1 ° and of
the respective implications of the two views for a possible liberal justification of
constitutional democracy. That discussion leads to a question about whether
Baker's communicative-ethical alternative eases in any way the "damaged goods"
claim I have made" and to which I am inclined to adhere.
Next, I consider Baker's proposal that we take, as the sole gauge of
normative political legitimacy in the here and now, the moral adequacy of actual,
concrete, current governmental practice-never mind trying to judge the

8. Rawls, supra n. 5, at 217.
9. See Frank I. Michelman, Ida's Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 345, 358-65 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Ida's Way]; Frank I. Michelman, Living
with Judicial Supremacy, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 579, 609-11 (2003).
10. See Baker, supra n. 1, at 532, 545.
11. See id. at 515.
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conformity of this practice to some separately posited set of constitutional
requirements."2 Baker's suggestion is that we should dispense with trying to make
the constitution act in that way as, or like, a contract. 13 With regard to this
suggestion-with which I am inclined to agree-I shall ask, first, whether the
suggested move makes the practice of constitutionalism irrelevant to liberal
assessments of normative political legitimacy (in other words, whether it renders
irrelevant to such judgments the constitutionalist dimension of constitutional
democracy); second, whether the move involves any less of a "displacement' ' 14 of
substance by (or onto) procedure than the constitution-as-contract view that the
move is meant to obviate; and, third, whether this move opens the way to a
possible claim of undamaged goods.
In a Kantian understanding of normative individualism, Baker writes, "[a]
person is free only when autonomously giving the law to herself."1 5 In an
alternative, relational, or communicative-ethical account, each individual person
adequately recognizes the freedom and equality of others by support of collective
action, as long as the collective action is conducted in a manner that meets the
"presuppositions of, or commitments implicit in, communicative action.' ' 16 An
advantage of the communicative-ethical view, Baker suggests, as compared with
the Kantian, is that the former does away with the worry that the persistence of
dissent to a collective decision-let us even stipulate reasonable dissentnecessarily makes coercive enforcement of that decision an affront to normative
individualism. 7 The communicative-ethical view, unlike the Kantian, does not
"require, even in principle as a prerequisite for the majority to coercively enforce
laws, that the laws receive agreement by all or even be adopted by a process
'8
accepted by all.'
It is not clear to me how this move gains us anything by comparison with the
contractualist-liberal,' 9 constitution-as-contract views my work has been
examining. On my understanding of such views, the word "accepted" in Baker's
"by a process accepted by all," should be regarded as a slip. The word ought to be
"acceptable, 20 (compare "could not reasonably reject"2 1 ). Once that substitution
is made, the Rawlsian-Kantian view and the communicative-ethical view start to
converge. They converge, moreover, not only toward the (possible) compatibility
of coercion of political losers with normative individualism, but also toward the
inevitability of "damaged goods."

12. See id. at 523.
13. See supra text following n. 7.
14. Baker, supra n. 1, at 517, 543.
15. Id. at 532.
16. Id. at 533.
17. Id. at 534.
18. Id. at 534-35.
19. On my usage of "contractualist," see supra note 7.
20. See e.g. Michelman, Relative Constraint and Public Reason, supra n. 6, at 974; Michelman,
ConstitutionalPatriotism,supra n. 6, at 1018-19.
21. Scanlon, supra n. 7, at 116-17; see Rawls, supra n. 5, at 49-50 n. 2, 124 (endorsing Scanlon).
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Baker asks, rhetorically: "Does fundamental disagreement mean the
essential moral failure of democracy or, more plausibly, at least the loss of moral
autonomy of the political losers?, 2 2 Rawlsian-Kantian liberalism answers: Of
course fundamental disagreement does not mean the moral failure of democracy,
if by "mean" you mean "equate to." A main point of Rawlsian, political-liberal
theorizing, after all, is to vindicate the idea that there does exist a set of
institutional and motivational conditions under which public support of morally
autonomy. 23
controversial, coercive laws is consistent with respect for everyone's
Even if, as may happen, the losers believe those conditions are not fulfilled in the
present instance, Rawlsian political liberals are prepared to maintain, on moral
will be mistaken about that and that in such
grounds, that the losers sometimes
24
cases coercion is justified morally.
What is more, the sorts of constitutional-legal conditions that Rawlsian
liberals would regard as conducive to that justificatory end could easily be-it
seems entirely likely that they are-quite similar to the ones communicative ethics
would pick out as necessary to constitute the "collectively fair (open, respectful,
reason giving) process" '25 that would, in a communicative-ethical view, render
coercion of dissenters by majorities morally appropriate. They would be, just as
Baker says, conditions pertaining to the fairness and openness of the lawmaking
process, to the safeguarding of fundamental rights, and to the dominance in the
process of public reason ("reasons that the presenter believes others could and
should accept" 26).
Baker's own writing points clearly to the kinship. At one point, Baker sums
up: "If proper participatory and moral rights are included within the constitutional
framework and the majority abides by this framework, that majority would act
properly in embodying their decisions in enforceable law despite the presence of
political losers., 27 The hand is the hand of Baker, but the voice is the voice of
constitution-as-contract.28
Like all variations on constitution-as-contract, Baker's proposal-were we
to take it strictly on those terms-would raise immediately the spectre of
reasonable disagreement, not only over whether the "proper" rights are contained
in the constitution but, more insidiously, over whether the majority is "abid[ing]

22. Baker, supra n. 1, at 532.
23. The focus here presumably would be on the "ascriptive" sense of autonomy, distinguished by
Richard Fallon from a "descriptive" sense. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of
Autonomy, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 875 (1994).
24. See e.g. Rawls, supra n. 5, at 137-39 ("[T]he political values expressed by [the] principles and
ideals [of a reasonably well-ordered constitutional regime] normally have sufficient weight to override
all other values that may come in conflict with them.... The. .. values of the political are very great
values and hence [are] not easily overridden .... ); id. at 157 ("[V]alues that conflict with the political
conception of justice and its sustaining virtues may be normally outweighed because they come into
conflict with the very conditions that make fair social cooperation possible on a footing of mutual
respect.").
25. Baker, supra n. 1, at 534.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 539.
28. See supra text following n. 7; supra text accompanying n. 8.
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by" the proper rights or, in other words, over whether a concededly proper set of
abstract constitutional rights ("the freedom of speech" or "equal protection of the
laws," for examples) have been given a correct, concrete application (say, in this
most recent interpretation of the constitution's requirements and prohibitions
respecting laws regulating political campaign finance). Baker says that if those
who collectively hold effective power sincerely and considerately judge the
answers to be yes, they are morally justified in coercing
the dissident. 9 Rawlsians
30
and other Kantians would agree wholeheartedly.
A question that remains is whether there may be cases in which, so judging,
both Habermasians and Rawlsians also would judge the dissenting views to be
ones that could be held, competently and sincerely, by persons trying just as hard
as they are to frame constitutional interpretations and applications in terms that
are (let us say, adopting the Habermasian formulation) acceptable to all from the
standpoint of each. 31 If so-and Baker does not appear to be denying this
possibility3 2 -then it seems to me that the goods, inescapably, are damaged; I shall
say a bit more about this below.
But let me be clear about what point I think I have made so far. It is not that
Baker, finally, adheres to a constitution-as-contract view. In fact, as we are about
to document, he outspokenly does not. My point so far is merely that a decidedly
communicative-ethical take on normative individualism is no less susceptible than
is a Rawlsian-Kantian take to the blandishments of constitution-as-contract
(however else we may think the two takes differ, a matter as to which I confess
deep confusion and uncertainty). Regarding the choice between constitution-ascontract and whatever alternative to that approach may arguably be preferable
from the standpoint of normative individualism, communicative ethics and
Rawlsian-Kantian contractualism stand on the same footing. That is the burden of
my argument so far.
Baker urges the rejection, or at least the skeptical reconsideration, of
constitution-as-contract. Maybe, he suggests, legitimacy is not necessarily, or even
appropriately, tied to judgments of the consistency of ordinary-level lawmaking
33
with "determinate terms of a universally acceptable constitutional contract.,
Perhaps, instead, "legitimacy involves a constantly raisable discourse of
legitimacy. 3 4 This could be a discourse that looks both backward in time to

29. See e.g. Baker, supra n. 1, at 535 ("[N]othing... requires that this judgmental authority be
denied either to individual dissenters, to the majority, or to the governing institutions charged with
enforcing its understanding of the law.").
30. See Rawls, supra n. 5, at 247 ("[W]e can maintain that the political conception is a reasonable
expression of the political values of public reason and justice between citizens seen as free and equal.
As such the political conception makes a claim on comprehensive doctrines in the name of those
fundamental values, so that those who reject it run the risk of being unjust, politically speaking.... If
we do so insist, others in self-defense can oppose us as using upon them unreasonable force.").
31. See JUrgen Habermas, A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality, in The
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory 3, 31 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., MIT
Press 1998).
32. See Baker, supra n. 1, at 531.
33. Id. at 523.
34. Id.
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achieved results and forward to expected further consequences. 35 In any case, the
discourse would not pin legitimacy judgments tightly to judgments of compliance
with "any pre-existing (actual or assumed) contract. 3 6 The question of legitimacy
would never be resolvable simply by application of any "set of particular legal
constitutional rules []or by a fully elaborated procedure or process[]."37 "Rather,
38
the inquiry is always open[, as well as] always related to... what is done now.
An advantage claimed by Baker for this contract-independent, presentist
approach (as we may call it) is that it sidelines the worry about reasonable
indeterminacy in the application of abstractly formulated, constitutional-legal
requirements.
Given an understanding of legitimacy as... an issue not looking for or
purportedly solved by the existence of a contract with uncontroversially right
content, the problem of determinacy takes on a different hue. Lack of determinacy
of rules, even constitutional rules, would not play the same crucial role of
undermining legitimacy as it did in the interpretation of constitutional
contractualism [what I have chosen here to call "constitution-as-contract"]
elaborated by Michelman .... [E]ven if in conflict, different views about "what
should currently be done" are presumably relatively determinate-can be argued
over-in contrast to the inherent indeterminacy
of what some past linguistic act says
39
about a then unenvisioned future.
My own thoughts currently run in a like direction. 4° What remain to mention
are a couple of quibbles. The first quibble pertains to what I take to be a further
point of agreement between Baker and myself.
Baker and I agree that the suggestion to dispense with constitution-ascontract does not amount to a suggestion that constitutionalism is irrelevant to
legitimacy-meaning by "constitutionalism" the practice of writing certain
constraints on the content of democratic lawmaking into a body of supreme law,
which an independent judiciary (perhaps) is expected then to apply decisively to
controverted cases, sometimes against the duly expressed will and judgment of
popularly elected branches of government. Why does it not? I have explained as
follows:
You could start with the ... idea that the "system" or "practice" of government
whose respect-worthiness you want to gauge consists of the entire aggregate of
concrete political and legal institutions, practices, laws, and legal interpretations

35. Results and consequences of what, exactly? See infra text accompanying and following n. 49.
36. Baker, supra n. 1, at 523.
37. Id. at 525.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 524.
40. See my writings cited supra note 9, especially Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 9, at 347-48
("Looking out at [the] governmental totality, one might ask oneself how various classes or groups of
persons are faring, and maybe how they would perceive matters from their own situations and
standpoints. One would apply whatever standards of freedom, justice, prosperity, distribution,
participation, and systemic openness to change one considers to be applicable. Finally, one would
judge whether the total performance is good enough, on the whole, to be accepted considering the
practical, imaginable alternatives.").
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currently in force or occurrent in the country. Call this "the governmental totality."
It would be, in effect, the currently surviving deposit of the country's entire history
to date of institutional and legal creation and revision. Notice that, if your country
happens to be one that relies substantially on judicial rulings to steer or constrain
decisions on matters of substance[,] ... the current governmental totality will be
composed, in significant part, of major, extant judicial rulings on such matters.

Suppose a country [does have] in place a "supreme law"-type of written
constitution containing entrenched recitals of rights against the government. We
might ask what, if anything, that fact about the country has to do with constructing
the "governmental system in place," whose respect-worthiness might supply the
major premise for a legitimation project.... [Tihe answer would be "probably
something but by no means everything."... If such a thing does happen in fact to
be there, as a part of a given country's governmental totality, [appraisals] of the
respect-worthiness of that totality probably will take its presence into account.[4 1 1 It
also will take into account any judicial rulings issued in its name that currently, as
matter of fact, form a part of the country's governmental system. But if it happens
that no such thing is there, the absence of it neither defeats appraisal nor points
[necessarily] toward a negative appraisal.42

Constitutionalism, in short, is relevant to the presentist style of legitimacy
appraisal. The presence of constitutionalism in a political practice (or its absence
therefrom) might contribute a positive or a negative vector to overall appraisal of
the "respect-worthiness 43 of the practice. Baker's comparable endorsement of
the continuing relevance of constitutionalism to legitimacy judgments is more
succinct but fully clear: "In the view of constitutional democracy [that Baker

proposes], the majority should always act in accord with universal moral demands,
demands possibly included in a constitution and possibly identified by courts,

although the choice of these implementation features raise separate pragmatic and
epistemological matters." 44

Baker clearly is allowing, as I do, for the possibility that the presence of
constitutionalism within a given, present political practice can be a positive factor,
from which it would follow that it can be a factor that makes the difference

between that practice's passing or not passing legitimacy muster.
We come, now, to my second quibble. As one advantage of the presentist
approach to legitimacy-testing,
Baker claims that it

by comparison

with constitution-as-contract,

dispenses with the... finally inadequate (e.g., as indicated by the conclusion that we
must accept "damaged goods") procedural displacement argument for the
constitution-that is, an argument that our need for a constitution follows from the
41. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 180 (Princeton U. Press 1988). Levinson refers to
the Constitution as a "presence" that may or may not be deemed "encouraging" to "the establishment
of a more perfect Union." Id. [Footnote in original.]
42. Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 9, at 347,360-61.
43. Id. at 346-48.
44. Baker, supra n. 1, at 540.
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need to transform laws into ones that a person can accept as her own even when she
disagrees with their content. 45
I believe this claim may overreach. It can stand unscathed only if Baker
rejects totally the idea that the moral supportability of government is a virtue that
we locate (when we judge it to be present) in "regimes, 46 or "practices 47 of
government conceived as more inclusive than-as transcending in some way-any
single one of the sundry, individuated laws and other governmental acts issuing
from the regime or practice, among which at any given time are bound to be some
that some among us will judge, not unreasonably, to deviate grievously from what
justice truly requires.
It seems to me that Baker does not reject this idea. 48 The key passage, I
believe, occurs at page 523:
[C]onsider the possibility that legitimacy involves a constantly raisable discourse of
legitimacy. For help in finding answers, such a discourse would likely look both
backward to an actual history and forward toward predictable consequences of the
current regime.... People will predictably disagree both about the merits of
present law and the proper interpretation or appropriation of past events. But they
can continue to ask: given this history, given predictable consequences,
is this
49
present law or application of constitutional principle legitimate?
Given this history of what? Given these predictable consequences of what?
Of one or another particular, individuated "present law or application of
constitutional principle"? No. Rather, "of the current regime" of which this or
that particular item is a component, aspect, or manifestation.
Like me and countless other liberals, it appears, Baker regards the question
of a particular law's legitimacy (its assertion upon us of a claim to support based in
political morality), as distinct from the question of its true and direct conformity to
the demands of justice. In good, political-liberal fashion, Baker ties the legitimacy
of the particular law to an approving judgment passed upon the past, the present,
and the expected future of a more encompassing complex from which that law
issues or in which it is embedded. Call that complex a practice, call it a regime,
call it a system. Whichever you call it, I do not see how Baker can maintain that
the presentist approach to legitimacy assessment affords an escape from the
"procedural displacement" that he links directly to the damaged-goods claim that
I have advanced .

45. Id. at 543.
46. Id. at 523.
47. Id.
48. At one point, Baker questions how tightly the benefits of legal ordering are tied to people's
actual acceptance of the legitimacy of the law. See id. at 542-43. However, that question is directed to
legitimacy in its empirical sense, whereas my inquiries have been directed, as Baker elsewhere points
out, see Baker, supra n. 1, at 511, 515-16, to a normative question of legitimacy, which Baker apparently
agrees has independent significance. See id. at 529 (observing approvingly that "hypothetical
contractarian analysis is an aspect of substantive moral reasoning, not a pale substitute for empirical
agreements" (footnote omitted)).
49. Id. at 523.
50. See supra text accompanying n. 45.
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Procedural displacement is an accompaniment of liberal legitimacy discourse
in general, not exclusively of the constitution-as-contract sub-version of the
discourse. In order to explain, I must first say a bit about how the expression
"procedural" is to be understood in the present context. We can stick with John
Rawls as our example. Recall that Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy requires
that coercive political power be exercised subject to the constraint of a set of
constitutional essentials adequately reflecting political principles and ideals that
everyone as reasonable and rational can accept. 5' Needless to point out, Rawls
maintains that a set of constitutional essentials meeting that standard necessarily
includes guarantees regarding the content of laws, not just the institutional and
procedural protocols for lawmaking. 2 In what sense, then, might I or Baker say
(as both of us do) that Rawlsians propose a procedural test for political
justification? The answer is that "procedural," in this context, does not mean a
test concerned only with matters of lawmaking protocol as distinguished from the
content of the lawmaking product. It rather means a test that is abstracted or
deflected from the most immediate and concrete issues of morality and public
policy that are obdurately and divisively controversial in society.
In sum: As Rawls sees matters, a constitution, including its guarantees of
substantive constraint on lawmaking, defines an institutional framework53 for use
in settling sundry, concrete controversies in the field of public policy that
practically require political resolution one way or the other. The constitution thus
provides the procedure correlative to which the controversies it is used to settle
compose the substance. The proceduralist impulse is the impulse to deflect-in
Baker's language, to "displace"-legitimacy testing away from the individuated,
ground-level, politically decidable questions that compose the agendas of ordinary
politics, so as to focus it instead on a framework or practice for deciding such
questions.
By now, it should be clear that, while constitution-as-contract is one kind or
instance of procedural displacement, it does not exhaust the category. Any
deflection of legitimacy assessment upward or outward-from a given,
individuated resolution of a current political controversy to the horizon of
framework or practice-is an instance of the category. The category thus includes
the kind of contract-independent, holistic-presentist assessment of the practice (as
respect-worthy or not) that Baker and I are both inclined to favor over
constitution -as-contract.

51. See supra text accompanying n. 8.
52. See Rawls, supra n. 5, at 227 (including among "constitutional essentials" the "equal basic rights
and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect: such as the right to vote and to
participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and of association, as well as the
protections of the rule of law").
53. See e.g. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 28 (rev. ed., Harv. U. Press 1999) ("A just social system
defines the scope within which individuals must develop their aims, and it provides a framework of
rights and opportunities and the means of satisfaction within and by the use of which these ends may
be equitably pursued."); Rawls, supra n. 5, at 325 ("[T]he basic liberties.., specified by institutional
rights and duties ... are a framework of legally protected paths and opportunities.").
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In a remark I quoted above 4 Baker has pointed out the sting that lurks in
this conclusion. It means that "damaged goods" describes the plight of all of us
liberals committed to reciprocity,5 5 insofar as we admit that some important laws
currently in force are reasonably regarded as unjust by persons judging
competently from the standpoint of communicative ethics or liberal public reason,
and despite any refuge we may seek from such admissions in a transcendent
notion of system, framework, or practice. Baker and I agree that non-refutable,
communicative-ethically defensible perceptions of injustice do not and cannot be
expected to stop at the system's edge. 6 That proposition holds whether we
conceive of the system as an as-it-were constitutional contract or, alternatively, we
conceive of it as a purely free-standing practice, having its own, immanent past,
present, and future, to be appraised by direct application of constitutionally
unmediated, liberal political morality. 7

"[W]hat makes the Constitution legitimate"-Professor Balkin writes by
way of summing up my view-"is that everyone in the political community can, at
least in theory, reasonably give their respect to the governmental system in place
as they understand it and interpret it."'58 Well, yes, if you read the sentence in a
certain way, with certain interpolations, in a certain context. The sentence makes
me nervous, though, for two reasons.
First, Balkin's sentence risks conflating empirical with normative legitimacy.
By failing to distinguish expressly between (1) factual judgments regarding the
expected stability of a political regime and (2) normative judgments regarding the
moral justifiability of the regime's claim to public support (which of those two
does Balkin's "legitimate" refer to?), Balkin's sentence may obscure an important
question: How, if at all, do normative judgments regarding legitimacy and respectworthiness depend on empirical judgments regarding stability? Second, Balkin's
sentence may understate the depth of the protestantism 9 I am trying to bring
myself to contemplate.
Consider Balkin's restatement of the same proposition a few sentences later:
"[W]hat produces the legitimacy of the Constitution and [other existing
governmental] practices is the fact that people can all agree to disagree about
what the Constitution and those practices mean." 6 That looks to me like a causal
proposition: X produces Y. Now, where the cause is a fact, so must be the effect.
If-the proposition runs-it really is a fact that people can all agree to disagree
amicably about constitutional meanings, then stability may ensue as a

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See supra text accompanying n. 45.
See supra text accompanying nn. 4-5.
See Baker, supra n. 1, at 531.
See Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 9, at 363.
Balkin, supra n. 6, at 492.
See id. at 492-93.
Id. at 493.
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consequence of that fact (among other facts, of course). In other words, the
political order of which the constitution is a part may be stable in fact, and one
contributing, productive reason for that stability may be the social or behavioral
fact that the preponderant fraction of the people retain loyalty to the order
despite their awareness of serious disagreements among them about the order's
meaning.
I have no quarrel at all with such a proposition or with an attribution of it to
things I have said in print.61 Yet, as Balkin very nicely conveys, an empirical
expectation of stability is not the only-or the primary-sort of "legitimacy" with
which I have been concerned.62 Rather, my primary concern has been the
question with which I opened this reply: How can liberals committed to normative
individualism justify conduct in support of the coercive operations of
constitutional-democratic government?
Used in a normative sense, "legitimate" is a response to a question about.
moral justification for one's conduct of a certain sort, as in: "I, a person of liberal,
reciprocity-bound, political-moral conviction, 63 am justified in supporting the
coercive application of laws insofar as they may be legitimate; and laws are
legitimate when they spring from a respect-worthy governmental order or
practice." Now, "respect-worthy," in a sense that will fit my argument, is not a
fact, it is a judgment. The difference is this: We locate facts in the world, "third
person." We locate judgments in consciousness, "first person." Every judgment,
but not any fact, carries a trailing "I" (which is not to say that it may not also carry
a trailing "we"; the subjective does not exclude the intersubjective).
Much aided by my encounters with Baker's and Balkin's commentaries, I
now would write Balkin's sentence differently: What can make it morally justifiable
for me, a reciprocity-committedpolitical liberal, to support the coercive operations
of constitutional democracy in my country, can only be my judgment that every
reciprocity-minded (a/ka "reasonable") person within range has reason to accept
the governmental system in place as I construe that system, although reasonable
disagreementspersist about whether the system in place is in all respects what justice
requires in a reciprocity-minded,political-liberal view. Thus, what gives me my
justification is not any fact about the universal reasonable acceptability of the
system in place, 64 it is my judgment regarding that question, made on the basis of
my understandingof what the system in place is.
That way of putting the matter would, I believe, be satisfying to Baker.65 It
also accords with what I would understand to be a "protestant" stance toward the
normative question of governmental legitimacy. Notice, though, that putting the
matter that way does not render the possibly conflicting judgments of others
irrelevant to my judgment regarding systemic respect-worthiness. If others

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Michelman, Ida's Way, supra n. 9, at 362-65.
See Balkin, supra n. 6, at 485-86.
See supra text accompanying n. 5.
I am not denying that there may be such a fact.
See supra n. 29 and accompanying text.
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construe the system differently from how I do and judge it less favorably, I have
reason to pay attention. I may do so in the hope or expectation of learning from
them. More radically, I may do so because factual expectations regarding
stability, and regarding the breadth and depth of the coercion that a stable system
on my terms would impose on not-unreasonable others, are factors bearing
directly on my judgment (reciprocity-bound as it is) regarding systemic respectworthiness. 66 Nevertheless, the judgment, finally, must be mine to make about
whether public support of the system is or is not morally warranted. This is not
the sort of question that a vote, for example, could possibly settle for merelevantly informative though votes sometimes may be.
Accordingly, I balk at Balkin's attribution to me of an ideal-observer sort of
theory of legitimacy: 67 "If Ida [the hypothetical ideal observer] would give assent,
based on the content that she reasonably imagines the system to have, then the
system is legitimate, even if not everyone in the system actually does give
assent.",68 In my view, that formulation risks making too little allowance for
reasonable, competent, reciprocity-minded disagreement about both the most
accurate construction of the system and its deservingness of respect as thus
construed. Legitimacy, I want to argue, is, from the standpoint of a reciprocityminded liberal, an insuperably and irreducibly decentralized, personal judgment.
It is, to be sure, a judgment concerned, in part, both with how others have reason
to judge and how others may be expected to judge. It is nevertheless my
judgment. Unlike individual preferences regarded from the standpoint of a
utilitarian morality, legitimacy judgments in reciprocity-minded liberalism are not
publicly liquidatable in the hypothetical judgment of an ideal observer.
So is legitimacy not, then, in my view, "a matter of acts of individual
conscience collectively considered"? 69 That would be an overstatement. A
judgment regarding legitimacy refers, in part, to a judgment regarding stability;
and a judgment regarding stability is, in significant part, a matter of the
conscientious attitudes of individuals, collectively considered. To that far from
trivial extent, a legitimacy judgment is, indeed, a matter of individual stances
collectively considered; only not considered from any ideal-observer or thirdperson standpoint, but rather from the first-person standpoint of anyone making
the judgment.
With that clarification on the table, I will have to consider, and I hope Balkin
will consider, whether facts of constitutional change "put[] Frank's conception of
legitimacy at risk"70 in quite the way Balkin suggests." Balkin offers important
and bracing discussions of the constructed character of political reason,72 and also

66. See Rawls, supra n. 5, at 141 ("Unless [a political conception for the basic structure of society is
sufficiently stable], it is not a [morally] satisfactory political conception .....
67. See Balkin, supra n. 6, at 494.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 503.
70. Id. at 504.
71. See id. at 503-10.
72. See Balkin, supra n. 6, at 506-08.
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of the crucial role played by constitutional protestantism-understood as a
process "by which and through which individual and dissenting constitutional
interpretations become widely accepted and promulgated" 73 -in recouping the
possibility of affirmative, reciprocity-minded, liberal judgments of legitimacy from
the constructed character of political reason. To refer legitimacy judgments to an
ideal observer, Balkin observes, would be to "gloss over" crucial questions about
whether and how the construction

of public reason

occurs7 4 and about

"asymmetr[ies] in social position and political
of various would-be
contributors to the social processes of construction.
So it would. So, too, I have not given those questions the attention that
Balkin shows so clearly they deserve. However, it is not an ideal-observer view
that has kept me from them, and I won't need to scrap such a view in order to get
moving. Ed Baker and Jack Balkin, I expect, will be around to help keep my nose
to the grindstone.
power"75

73. Id. at 510.
74. Id. at 507.
75. Id. at 504.
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